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PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SUPREME COURT I1
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
ONE year ago, in the first installment of this article, the attempt was
made to sketch out the juristic picture of the reconstructed Su-
preme Court, to consider the changing techniques of the judicial process,
the gradual disappearance of the doctrine of stare decisis, the multi-
plication of dissents, the growth of judicial legislation and the resultant
chaotic condition of constitutional law. Today it is permissible to repeat
the statement that the new Supreme Court is producing more dissents
and cross-court criticisms than any other Supreme Co.rt in the same
short span of time.
The evidence of these developments may be found in the decisions
of the Supreme Court, in the infrequent and occasional extra-judicial
utterances of the Justices, and also in the writings of legal scholars-
all supporting the view that new judicial methods are unfolding which
tend to deal with many cases in the Supreme Court as novel judicial
experiences, which permit and indeed invite the Court to make personal-
ized decisions without too much emphasis upon past precedents.
First let us scan the statistical data regarding the recent terms of the
Supreme Court, then pause to pick up a few appraisals by competent
critics. Thereafter we will turn to the Supreme Court for additional
materials disclosing that the Court is passing through a period which
points to the erosion of enduring case-law. We do not stop to appraise
the new freedom in the judicial approach, but merely to announce its
arrival.
A series of articles convince that the trend in the Supreme Court has
been in the direction of individualized justice and a theory of judicial
decision which emphasizes the freedom of the judicial will rather than the
guiding influences of past precedents. Limiting our survey to the period
of the recent reorganization of the Supreme Court,' the successive terms
from 1938 to 1942 show a range of non-unanimous opinions as follows:2
t Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. The reorganization of the Supreme Court through the nomination of eight Justices
by President Roosevelt began with the appointment of Mr. Justice Black on August 12,
1937, and was completed with the nomination of Mr. Justice Rutledge on January 11, 1943.
Between these dates, Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes and Jackson
had also been appointed. Mr. Justice Byrnes resigned on October 3, 1942. The only
members of the present Court who were on the Supreme Bench prior to 1937 are Chief
Justice Stone and Justice Roberts.
2. Pritchett, The Coming of the New Dissent: The Supreme Court, 1942-43 (1943)
11 U. or Cm. L. REv. 49. Professor Pritchett has analyzed the records of dissents on the
Supreme Court from 1931 through the 1941 terms in three previous articles, which enabled
him to reach the following conclusion: "The statistics show, in fact, that from a quanti-
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Non-unanimous
Total Opinions Dissenting
Term Opinions Number Per-Cent Votes Cast
1938 149 50 34 110
1939 141 42 30 85
1940 169 47 28 117
1941 162 59 26 160
1942 171 75 44 176
This gradual increase in the total number of dissents reached a new
high in the 1943 Term when over 175 dissenting votes were recorded
and over 50% of the-cases decided with full opinions disclosed a divided
court. At the half way mark in the 1944 Term an informal count indi-
cates that there were 31 dissents in the first 70 cases decided, evidencing
dissents in 44% of the current cases.3
Here is indeed objective evidence of increasing judicial disagreement
and dissent among the justices in the Supreme Court. But it would be
gross oversimplification to stop with the counting of dissents and dis-
agreements and summarize therefrom the exact degree of confusion with
the Court. Such figures portray the quantitative elements in the judicial
decisions but by no means depict accurately the qualitative and enduring
consequences of these dissents. The varying importance of the cases,
the extent of the disagreement of the justices,4 the emphasis and tone
of the dissenting opinions,5 the discovery of a new departure and a new
trend in major principles of constitutional law-all these factors cannot
be evaluated or even discovered by the mere count of dissents.
tative point of view at least, the reorganized Supreme Court has become by -far the most
badly divided body in the history of that institution." Id. at 49.
3. Wood, Dissents in High Court Reflect Basic Division, N. Y. Times, February 25,
1945, section E, p. 7.
4. This tendency of the Supreme Court to multiply the number of opinions, -both in
concurrence and in dissent, has grown appreciably in the last few years. For example,
Northwestern Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944) produced a five to four decision
but the exact permanent effect of the majority opinion will doubtless be lessened because
there were three separate opinions.
A great deal of doubt attaches to the permanent aspects of United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944) because it was decided by a minority
of four Justices, Justices Reed and Roberts not participating in the opinion. If only one
of the two Justices who voluntarily withdrew had been on the Court and had voted to
affirm, this one additional vote would have resulted in an affirmance of the District
Court's conclusion that "the business of insurance is not commerce, either interstate or
intrastate." See BRANDT, How To FIND Tyrr LAW (1940) 290.
5. Of late there has been a notable tendency.on the part of the Justices to bring into
the open Court their quarrels and to use in formal opinions expressions usually reserved
for their inner conferences. Professor Powell has correctly warned that these cross-court
1945]
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Fortunately, we need not depend upon a "comptometer approach"
in attempting to evaluate the confusion of judicial voices or to appraise
the present standing of stare decisis. More personal and certainly more
persuasive than mass statistics in the discovery of new trends in the
Supreme Court are the studied appraisals of careful scholars who warn
that the Supreme Court is no longer functioning under the Pound-
Cardozo formula: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."6
Instead we are told that a new maxim is forming in the Court of last
resort: "Law must not stand still long enough to become stable! "' A
remark that calls to mind Professor Powell's split-second appraisal of
the mobility of constitutional law:
"Of late in discussing cofistitutional questions with a class on Monday morn-
ings, I have thought it wise to look at my watch to see if I could be confident
that what I was about to say was still true. At noon the Supreme Court
might begin to announce opinions that would rob me of much of my hard
earned knowledge."
In more serious vein the charges are made that stare decisis is lightly
tossed aside when opportunism or realism beckons. Principles bend to
meet the exigencies of the moment; precedents are ignored or by-passed.'
But we also find considerable support for the thesis that stare decisis
is crumbling from the Justices of the Supreme Court who have by ex-
press word or by implication indicated that a judicial reformation is
under way, whether for good or ill. Statements in recent judicial opinions
show a formal accusation of such infiltration of personal views.10 The
comments should not be over-emphasized because of their apparent sharpness, but they
do at least indicate an undertone of antagonistic legal philosophies that are more enduring
than the verbal fireworks on display. Powell, Our High Court Analyzed, N. Y. TnI.Is
MAGAZINE, June 18, 1944, p. 17.
6. It is believed that this favorite aphorism was first phrased by Dean Pound. It was
later used by Justice Cardozo at the beginning and at the end of THE GaowmI OF TnE LAw
(1924) -2, 143.
7. Address of Rev. Robert I. Gannon, S.J., at the Annual Dinner of the New York
State Bar Association, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, January 20, 1945, supra
pp. 1-7.
8. Powell, Changing Constitutional Phases (1939) 19 B. U. L. REv. 509. If precedent
is necessary to justify a trace of humor, which is certainly needed today more than ever,
we have it in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: ". . . I would not convey the thought
that an opinion is the worse for being lightened by a smile." CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE
(1931) 29.
9. Dykman, Annual Address of the President, New York State Bar Association (1945)
17 N. Y. STATE BULLETIN 4-5.
10. Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continental Investment Company, 320 U. S. 661, 672-
674 (1944), concurring opinion of Black, J.; Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321
U. S. 96 (1944), dis. op. of Roberts, J., 105-113. See also Kennedy, Portrait of the New
Supreme Court I (1944) 13 FoRDnr.m L. REV. 4-5.
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most recent expression regarding the present status of precedents in
the Supreme Court is found in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association.1 Chief Justice Stone saw in this most important
decision a violent detour from. stare decisis and appraised the conse-
quences of the departure in the.following words:
"The decision now rendered repudiates this long continued and consistent
construction of the commerce clause and the Sherman Act. We do not say
that this is in itself a sufficient ground for declining to join in the Court's
decision. This Court has never committed itself to any rule or policy that it'
will not 'bow to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning'
by overruling a mistaken precedent . . . This is especially the case when the
meaning of the Constitution 'is at issue and a mistaken construction is one
which cannot be corrected by legislative action.
"To give blind adherence to a rule or policy that no decision, of this Court
is to be overruled would be itself to overrule many decisions of the Court
which do not accept that view. But the rule of stare decisis embodies a wise
policy because it is often more important that a rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right. This is especially so where as here, Congress is not
without regulatory power.'
2
Justice Jackson joined the dissenting Chief Justice in the South-
Eastern Underwriters case. In .his separate dissenting opinion Justice
Jackson developed a novel contention regarding the doctrine of stare
decisis which deserves mention now and more complete appraisal later.
Brushing aside the general belief that stare decisis is a legalistic strait-
jacket which holds back beneficial reforms, the dissenting Justice brought
forth the fact that stare decisis may serve as a check against precipitate
and unconsidered change in the law with results that are far reaching
and disastrous. Conceding that if the question were one of first impres-
sion, he would "have no misgivings about holding that insurance business
is commerce," he questions the practical effect which would flow from
a sudden transfer of regulatory powers over insurance from State to
Federal Government. 3
Oddly enough, one of the most impressive indications of the failing
force of stare decisis is found in the South-Eastern Underwriters case
In at least three places Professor Thomas R. Powell has stressed the fact that stare
decisis has been materially weakened in recent years: Our High Court Analyzed, NEW
YORK TMxEs MAGAZINE, June 18, 1944, p. 17; Changing Constitutional Phases, (1939)
19 B. U. -L. REv. 509; Insurance as Commerce (1944) 57 1-ARV. L. REV. 937. To the same
effect is the following remark of Professor Garrard Glenn: "The Supreme Court is receiving
a great deal of criticism with respect of its present habit of overruling itself on the slightest
provocation, more often with none at all." Glenn, Effect of Discharge in Bankruptcy:
Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Court (1944) 30 VA. L. REv. 531.
11: 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
12. Id. at 579. Italics inserted.
13. Id. at 585-586.
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buried and concealed in the prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice Black.
After stating that the Supreme Court was deciding for the first time
"whether the Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power to regu-
late insurance transactions stretching across state lines,"' 4 the learned
Justice describes the many individual acts done by the insurance com-
panies in the conduct of their business-the "continuous and indivisible
stream of intercourse among the states"-and concludes that the multi-
plicity of such acts as collection of premiums, negotiation of contracts,
settlement of claims, placement of insurance on fixed and portable prop-
erties clearly spells out interstate commerce.1-
Then follow these striking sentences:
"Despite all of this, despite the fact that most persons, speaking from
common knowledge, would instantly say that of course such a business is en-
gaged in trade and commerce, the District Court felt compelled by decisions
of this Court to conclude that the insurance business can never be trade or
commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. We must therefore
consider these decisions"' 6
The pivotal words in the above passage have been emphasized by
italics because they bring out more clearly the startling fact that Mr:
Justice Black, dealing with this tremendously complicated problem of
the legal status of insurance, is willing to accept the "common knowl-
edge" of "most persons" who would "instantly say" that "of course"
the insurance business is one which involves trade and commerce. This
passage likewise discloses that such "common knowledge" is preferred
to the matured judgment of the District Court based upon past prece-
dents of the Supreme Court of the United States. A popular appraisal
"instantly" given receives higher rating from Mr. justice Black than
the measured evaluation of earlier cases of the highest court by the
Federal District Court.
Having found that the District Court was still constrained to follow
precedents which apparently led to the conclusion that insurance was
not commerce, Mr. Justice Black stated with some apparent reluctance:
"We must therefore consider these decisions."' 7 The implication seems
to be that such consideration of precedents became necessary only be-
cause the District Court unfortunately failed to recognize "the common
knowledge" of laymen generally that insurance is commerce. This easy
14. Id. at 534. However, it should be noted that Chief Justice Stone insists strongly
that the Supreme Court cases from Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869) to the present
time uniformly held "that the business of insurance is not interstate commerce. .. .
Id. at 569.
15. Id. at 541-542.
16. Id. at 542-543. Italics inserted.
17. Id. at 543.
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disposition of the basic legal question which divided the Supreme Court
in this very case-whether insurance is commerce-is apparently accom-
plished by Justice Black's reference to the judgment of laymen.' This
substitution of popular referendum for an orderly examination of legal
principles and pertinent precedents comes close to the formulas of emo-
tional jurisprudence wherein law is felt rather than studied.
An extreme expression of this emotion-formula of law is found in
the tragic-comic career of Lord Hermand as told by Lord Cockburn in
his reminiscences of Scottish judges.
"Bacon advises judges to draw their law 'out of your books, not out of your
brain.' Hermand generally did neither. He was very apt to say, 'My Laards, I
feel my law-here, my Laards,' striking his heart. Hence he sometimes made
little ceremony in disdaining the authority of an Act of Parliament when he
and it happened to differ. He once got rid of one which Lord Meadowbank
(the first), whom he did not particularly like, was for enforcing because the
legislature had made it law, by saying, in his snorting, contemptuous way, and
with an emphasis on every syllable: 'But then we're told that there's a statute
against all this. A statute! What's a statute? Words. Mere Words! And
am I to be tied down by words? No, my Laards; I go by the law of right
reason.' "19
Lord Hermand would seem to qualify for high place in current schools
of advanced realism.
However often the Justices individually may stray away from the path
of precedents, we are heartened to find that in varying degrees, all
the members of the Court have expressed regret at some piece of person-
alized adjudication by their brethren which aroused their ire.2" There
18. Referring to the quoted passage in 1.fr. Justice Black's opinion, Professor Powell
makes the following observations anent the dangers of substituting popular for professional
judgment in the matters for technical legal problems: "The common knowledge of persons
untrained in the law is a precarious mentor of legal postulates and differentiations. For
this, one can adduce melancholy testimony from many lawyers who have suffered from
the inapposite arguments of experts in economics and in what is miscalled political science.
It is little less than shocking to have a Justice of the Supreme Court invoke the mere
supposition of common knowledge among lesser breeds without the law as worthy of
consideration against the conclusion of a district court which preferred to respect its obli-
gation to be faithful to superior controlling precedents rather than to traduce them by
resort to vaguely indicated ancient locutions and to unspecified contemporary supposed
common knowledge of suppose most persons." Powell, Insurance As Commerce (1944)
57 HARv. L. REv. 988.
19. Cockburn, Some Old Scotch Judges (1899) 1 UeiE VRsx ALNTHOLOGY 329, 339.
20. From Justice Black, leader of the liberal wing, to Justice Roberts, the most con-
servative member of the Supreme Court, we find that all the Justices have paid tribute
to the value of stare decisis and each Justice has at times been accused of departure from
the path of precedent. For example, see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
315 U. S. 289 (1942) for a defense of stare decisis by Justices Black and Murphy; Mulford
1945]
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is also evidence available that they hold that the doctrine of stare decisis,
if not a permanent ideal or unchanging concept, is at least recognized as
a convenient anchor against whimsical judging and individualized
decisions."'
WHY IS STARE DECISIS CRUMBLING?
What is the explanation of this increasing and mounting departure
from precedents by the Supreme Court, and by other courts as well?
Is it found in any single cause or is it a result of many interlocking
factors of varying weights? We now proceed to consider a series of
alleged causes for the erosion of the doctrine of stare decisis. The
causes for this individualized justice, loss of stability of precedents and
break down of continuity of law are not easy to catalogue or to evaluate;
there are multiple factors which have brought about this collapse of
traditional values.
Is this flexibility of judicial decisions in the field of consitutional
law inherent in the nature of constitutional questions?22 Certain it is
that there is a wide difference between private law and public law and
these differences have been emphasized early and late in our history.
Conceding the presence of this factor, it provides no adequate reason
for the present tendency to explain constitutional "law" in terms of
constitutional "politics."23
Is the judicial confusion of the Supreme Court explainable by the
personalized and diversified legal philosophies of the eight Justices come
lately to the Supreme Court? It would be dangerous to conclude that
the recent influx of new members to the Supreme Court explains the
current collapse of stare decisis. Such oversimplification is tempting,
but inadequate as anything more than a partial explanation. To rest
content with this explanation would be to ignore the fact that all eight
Justices were appointed after an appraisal of their current legal eco-
nomic, social and industrial views on matters confronting the federal
government.
Is this shifting body of decisional law due to the novel and complex
questions of constitutional law that have come forth during the de-
v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 54 (1939) for a criticism of Justice Roberts in dis. op. by justice
Butler on the ground that justice Roberts' decision is "contrary alike to reason and
precedent." Cf. conc. op. in .Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continental Investment Co.,
320 U. S. 661, 672-673 (1944); dis. op. in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 105
(1944) and in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 172, 173 (1943).
21. Despite criticism of stare decisis by modem legal scholars (infra, 000-000) the
importance of stability and predicability of law is stressed by the court and lawyers
generally.
22. For a lengthy argument to this effect, see HAnEs, THE ROLE OF r1E SuPRE=
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835 (1944).
23. HAINES, op. cit. supra note 22. See notes 50-57, infra.
[Vol. 14
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pression decade of 1930-1940, questions which are a necessary overflow
of the social, economic, industrial and political disorders of this dis-
tressed period? Certain it is that the Supreme Court has faced unusual
and original problems in the pre-war decade and that these problems
contain legal and extra-legal, political and social consequences, diffi-
cult to appraise and to evaluate. Any critique of the Supreme Court
must include the concession that the times have been abnormal during
the past two decades, calling for a reconsideration of the old constitu-
tiondl doctrines in their impact upon present-day problems. But once
more the warning is in order that these trying times provide but a
partial and not a complete explanation of the volatile qualities of
current constitutional law.
Is the present World War a sufficient cause to explain the excesses
and abnormalities of constitutional decisions? True indeed, the condi-
tion of current law may be a resultant of world wide dislocation of
peacetime processes, the upside down economy of a world at war, the
application of the classic maxim silent leges inter arma. Free admission
must be made that, while war has n6t silenced law, it has materially
affected the type of legal questions in all courts including the United
States Supreme Court. But it is still in order to reaffirm that in the
present struggle, America still alms to be and is a government of laws
and not of men. War is not alone the cause of the farewell to stare
decisis, although it may be a factor.
Is the present erosion of stare decisis explainable on the ground that
the courts and the lawyers have been faced with a monumental output
of judicial decisions, the steadily mounting pile of case law, producing
diverse decisions which no court can read, no lawyer can digest, no legal
scholar can catalogue? More about the multiplication of precedents
later. Undoubtedly the stated factor is very real and ever present, but
it will be later shown that the confusion of law is also traceable to
the decisions of the courts departing from precedents which are clearly
marked and in an area wherein the law is not indefinite or difficult to
find.2 4
Is modern jurisprudence responsible for this sudden urge to depart
from settled principles and established precedents? Subject to later
development2 5 the new jurisprudence is clearly a formidable factor, how-
ever hidden and concealed, and must be considered a vital cause of the
present-day status of stare decisis.
This series of questions, answered in summary fashion, warns that
the present trend away from authority in the Supreme Court cannot be
24. See infra pp. 16-20.
25. See infra pp. 21-26.
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traced to any single cause. We now turn to consider at some length
current explanations of the failure of case law and the enlargement of
individualized, judge-made law.
STARE DEcIsIS IN THE COURTS
A convenient and timely starting point in our appraisal is the scholarly
address recently delivered by Mr. Justice Jackson before the American
Law Institute under the title Decisional Law and Stare Decisis.20 Herein
Mr. Justice Jackson offers his explanation for "the depreciation of the
precedent":
"The present low estate of the precedent cannot be dissociated from the
enormous multiplication of precedents. . . . I am vaguely aware of a great
cloud of current decision of importance, both judicial and quasi-judicial, that
I do not have time to read, much less digest. And the total accumulation of
judicial utterances is even more formidable. I know that in this great mass
of opinions by men of different temperaments and qualifications and view-
points, writing at different times and under varying local influences, some
printed judicial word may be found to support almost any plausible
proposition."
There is a great deal of truth in the stated reason that the multiplica-
tion of precedents in recent years has made it difficult, ,if not impossible,
to keep abreast of all current output of the courts, or any single court.
Conceding that the multiplication of precedents may be a cause of the
lessening of respect for stare decisis, or of the difficulty in following
case law, it is submitted that there are other factors that deserve parallel
mention, factors which may compete with, if they do not surpass, the
principal cause of case-confusion emphasized by Mr. Justice Jackson.
There is evidence that the judicial opinion is sometimes framed without
benefit of stare decisis not because of the "multiplication of precedents"
currently existing and beclouding the legal problem, not because of
the confusion of the earlier authorities, but because the judge or judges
first depart' from the clear path of settled precedents and thereafter
seek "some printed judicial word" to support their plausible proposition.
In this situation it should be noted that the confusion follows, it does
not precede, the writing of such judicial opinions which reach their
conclusions first and then search hopefully later for supporting prece-
dents. True, such hasty departures from the settled law very often are
the causes of future confusion of judge and lawyer, but in such cases
the court first departs from precedents which are clearly marked and
yet evaded.
Let us illustrate by reference to a few current cases. Take, for exam-
26. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 334.
[Vol. 14
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ple, Schneiderman v. United States." In this case, the Supreme Court
held that the Government may reopen a naturalization decree which
confers citizenship on an alien and set aside the certificate of citizen-
ship as provided in the Federal statutes. A major and important-if
not decisive--question was: What is the degree of proof to be sustained
by the Government in its charge that the alien was illegally admitted
to citizenship? Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Murphy said:
"Assuming as we have that the United States is entitled to attack a
finding of attachment upon a charge- of illegality, it must sustain the
heavy burden which then rests upon it to prove lack of attdzchment by
'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence which does not leave the
issue in doubt.""'
Was this definition of burden of proof based upon any former prece-
dents? It is submitted that the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" test
was without support of pertinent precedents in the matter of any pre-
vious denaturalization proceedings and was moreover contrary to the
clear and frequent decisions by the Federal courts on the construction
of the prevailing statutes. Mr. Chief Justice Stone in his vigorous dis-
sent states the prevalent rule in the following words: "Until now this
Court, without a dissenting voice, has many times held that in a suit
under this statute it is the duty of the court. to render a judgment
cancelling the certificates of naturalization if the court finds upon
evidence that the applicant did not satisfy the conditions which Con-
gress had made prerequisite to the award of citizenship." 9
Let it be carefully noted that we are not now concerned with the
wisdom or necessity of a change in the prevailing buiden of proof in
denaturalization cases, but merely with the fact that this change was
made in Schneiderman v. United States and that it was not due to any
confusion or uncertainty of prior precedents. True, the Schneiderman
case is certainly one where there was what Mr. Justice Jackson calls "an
enormous multiplication of precedents," but these precedents laid down
a simple rule of procedure and a specific burden of proof which was
hurdled by the majority. Moreover the Schneiderman case obtained its
only support for the "clear-convincing-unequivocal" test by invoking
a line of authority that had nothing to do with the exact issue of proof
in denaturalization matters."0 The majority had to reach far afield to
27. 320 U. S. 118 (1943).
28. Id. at 135. Italics inserted.
29. Id. at 172-173.
30. Lacking any precise precedents imposing upon the government the duty, of sus-
taining the denaturalization action by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which
does not leave the issue in doubt," the Court indulged in a few semantic borrowings from
remote case-law having nothing to do with denaturalization cases. The "clear-unequivo-
cal-convincing" test came about by lifting a partial sentence from Johannessen v. United
1945]
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find "some printed judicial word" to support its newly found and freshly
framed evidentiary standard. The point of importance is that the de-
parture from the doctrine of stare decisis in Schneiderman v. United
States is not explained by any existing confusion of authorities. The
confusion follows, it did not precede, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Schneiderman v. United States.
Another case, which raises a doubt about the generality of Mr. Justice
Jackson's assumption that sheer weight, number and diversity of prece-
dents threaten the solidarity of law, is the recent case of United States
v. South-Esstern Underwriters Association.3 Up to the decision of this
case, the precedents were uniformly in step with the conclusion of Paul
v. Virginia,32 decided in 1869, which held that insurance is not com-
merce, and 'therefore cannot be interstate" comnerce. Following Paul v.
Virginia there was a succession of cases that were in support of Paul
v. Virginia and did not depart from the pioneer holding.3 The basic
question whether insurance is commerce was fully reaxgued in 1913 in
New York Life Insurance Company v. Deer Lodge County4 and the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia warning
against the danger of the overthrow of ancient landmarks. After re-
viewing the leading -cases from Paul v. Virginia down to 1913,. Mr.
Justice McKenna said; "If we consider these cases numerically, the
deliberation of their reasoning, and the time they cover, they constitute
a formidable body of authority and strongly invoke'the sanction of
the rule of stare decisis. This we especially emphasize, for all of the
cases concerned, as the case at bar does, the validity of state legislation,
and under varyihg circumstances the same principle was applied in all
of them. For over forty-five years they have been the legal justification
for such legislation. To reverse the cases, therefore, would require us
to promulgate a new rule of constitutional inhibition upon the States
and which would compel a change of their policy and a readjustment of
their laws. Such result necessarily urges against a change of decision."3
The action of the Supreme Court in the Underwriters case can hardly
States, 225 U. S. 227, 238 (1912) and another fragment from the Maxwell Land-Grant
Case, 121 U. S. 325, 381 (1887) and piecing them together for use in an entirely new
setting.
For a critical analysis of Schneiderman v. United States, see Kennedy, The Schneiderman
Case-Some Legal Aspects (1944) 12 FoRDHAm L. REV. 231; Timasheff, The Schneiderman
Case-ts Political Aspects (1944) 12 FORDHAt L. REV. 209.
31. 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
32. 8 Wall. 168 (1869).
33. See Stone, C.J., dis. op. in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,
322 U. S. 533, 562 (1944).
34. 231 U. S. 495 (1913).
35. Id. at 502.
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be explained on the ground that the previous authorities were vague
or confusing regarding the basic question: Is insurance commerce?
It seems that, while confusion will certainly follow, it did not precede
the adjudication in the South-Eastern Underwriiers decision.36 It suf-
fices to suggest that the "low estate of the precedent" is not always due
to lack of clarity of existing case-law or to the multiplicity of past
and current decisions, as suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson. It may
be partly due to the purposeful and direct objective to overthrow or
skirt cases clearly defined and readily available. Then the search for
"some printed judicial word" becomes important, but the tortured
statement of a "plausible proposition" in support frequently fails to
carry conviction.
The frequency of these judicial detours by the ' Supreme Court in
recent years has already been noted with the consequences that these
dpartures from the travelled highway are now leading to trails and
paths none too clearly marked.37 Perhaps Mr. Justice Jackson had these
devious detours in mind when he said:
"The first essential of a lasting precedent is that the court or the majority
that promulgates it be fully committed to its principle. That means such
individual study of its background and antecedents, its draftsmanship and
effects that at least when it is announced it represents not a mere acquiescence
but a conviction of those who support it. When that thoroughness and con-
viction are lacking, a new case presenting a different aspect or throwing new
light, results in overruling or in some other escape from it that is equally
unsettling to the law."'38
The quoted passage offers support for the contention herein made
36. The South-Eastern case is a perfect illustration of a situation wherein there are no
signs of any uncertainty in the law until the Supreme Court created it. The entire course
of judicial decisions after Paul v. Virginia, the failure of the United States government to
bring any action under the Sherman Act since 1890 against insurance organizations, the
statements in Congress that insurance was without the regulatory powers of the Congress
under the Interstate Commerce Clauser-all these various elements indicate the well-nigh
universal acceptance of the Paul case as a fixed precedent negativing the idea that insurance
is commerce. See dis. op. of Stone, C.J., 322 U. S. 533, 573-590 (1944).
Equally clear it is that the South-Eastern case settled nothing: First, because it is a
four-three decision which is not binding upon the full court; and second, because the states
and the insurance companies are now completely confused as to the zones of federal and
state control.
In its petition for a rehearing, filed September 1, 1944, the South-Eastern UnderwritLrs
Association asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision because as a result "hazards
have been imposed upon the negotiation of every insurance contract, and the very conduct
of the insurance business has been rendered perilous." New York Times, September 2,
1944, p. ,19. This case seems to be one which illustrates the direful consequences which
follows the speedy overthrow of settled precedents and the repentance at leisure.
37. Supra pp. 16-20.
38. Jackson, J., supra note 26, at 335.
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that the present confusion of case law in the Supreme Court is not due
alone to the increase in precedents or to the cloudy state of the earlier
authorities; it is also in part traceable to the purposeful departure of
the Court from past precedents which disclose a fairly clear and definite
line of authority. Confusion, it is true, is now following as a result of
these frequent departures from stare decisis but it is certainly not
always the initial cause of the "present low estate of the precedent."
Another explanation currently offered to account for the unprece-
dented number of dissents and the frequent departures from stare decisis
is the unusual number of appointments to the Supreme Court during
the recent reorganization. The total number of' Justices appointed by
President Roosevelt is indeed a record unsurpassed by any one Presi-
dent since the original establishment of the Supreme Court by George
Washington." There were many who believed that these appointments
by a single Chief Executive would produce sweetness and harmony in
judicial decisions. In theory at least, these appointments presupposed
a careful consideration of the political and economic as well as the legal
views of the nominees in accordance with the formula which has been
called "applied politics" in the highest sense of the word. ° The ante-
cedent relations of the individual Justices to the administration might
account for the superficial conclusion that these appointments would
be followed by an era of judicial harmony and a unanimous Court rather
than a period of increased discord and dissent.41
39. President Washington appointed ten justices between 1789 and 1796, while Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed eight justices between 1933 and 1944. He has ap-
pointed as many justices as the three preceding Chief Executives, Presidents Harding,
Coolidge and Hoover. HuGss, THE SUPREmE CO1Ri oF THE UNITED STATES (1936) 42-43.
40. Sometimes the "applied politics" does not function according to plan, as for exam-
ple, in the appointment of Justice Holmes by President Theodore Roosevelt after a careful
canvass of Holmes' political, economic and legal views. The famous dissent of Justice
Holmes in the Northern Securities case, 193 U. S. 197 (1904) nettled the President and
later the off-stage appraisal of the incident was given by Holmes in his delightful letter
to Sir Frederick Pollock. 2 HoLmEs-PoLLocx LETTERS 63 (1941).
41. "Doubtless many have assumed that with a renovated bench composed preponder-
antly of appointees of a single President not unconscious of the importance of judicial
outlook, there would be an increasing degree of unanimity. Such anticipations have not
been realized." Powell, Our High Court Analyzed, N. Y. Timrs MAGAZINE, June 18, 1944,
p. 44.
Other commentators are using the tables of mortality to set up the potential "time table
of influence" which will permit a President to control the decisions of the Court long after
he has retired from office. The theory is that so long as a Justice remains on the Bench
he will reflect the political and legal philosophy of the appointing Chief Executive. While
it is doubtless true that the Roosevelt appointees were selected in the main from close
adherents to the policies of the Administration, it is already clear that they had or have
developed a freedom of judicial approach that surmounts narrow partisanship.
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To the credit of the reformed Court it should be noted that this easy
assumption of judicial subservience to the appointing power was wholly
gratuitous and without any foundation in fact. As the record shows,
judicial independence and not subservience marks the Supreme Court
today. Indeed it is the excess of judicial independence that has brought
about the maximum disunity within the Couft and it is this super-
abundance of judicial independence that calls for criticism along with
a consideration of current philosophic theories and the general status
of law in our day and place.
But the stated factors of multiplication of precedents, change of per-
sonnel and chaotic conditions in the world about, fail to exhaust the
possible explanations of the breakdown of stare decisis. Thiere remains
to be considered something more penetrating and deep: A revolutionary
upsurge in the law, a revolt against solidarity of the common law, a
skepticism and cynicism regarding law in general which cannot be omit-
ted in any study of stare decisis. We now turn to consider briefly new
philosophies of law-largely American in origin and personnel-which
have lately become important in law school teaching and law review
writings.
SToRm OVER LAW ScHooLs
Two incidents separated by a span of 150 years indicate the startling
change in the course of American law in our Universities.
(1) The time was 1778. In the simple study of his rural parsonage
at Portsmouth, Reverend Ezra Stiles pondered on the wisdom of accept-
ing the recently tendered Presidency of Yale College. Tormented by
conflicting emotions, his decision was no easy one to make. He reflected
that the students would be, if rumors were reliable, "like wild fire, not
easily controlled"; financial burdens awaited him; collegiate scholarship
was at a low ebb; the country was torn by revolutionary strife. Know-
• ing full well that the "diadem of a president is a crown of thorns," he
nevertheless boldly elected to accept the presidency with true Christian
fortitude.4" In the inaugural address which followed, to the one hundred-
odd undergraduates and officers of Yale College, Ezra Stiles paid the
following tribute to the law:
"Let these youths observe how far the English law, whether by custom or
by acts of our legislature, has been embodied in that of America. Students
would find it useful also to examine the great principles of the English law,
both common and statute, for their own worth; they would find it beneficial
to follow the closely reasoned opinions of the English judges- by reading the
report of the cases decided in Westminster Hall.' 43
42. The incident about President Stiles is taken from HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY
rN CONsERVATiSM (1939) 3-4.
43. Id. at 5-6.
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Thus did President Ezra Stiles pay tribute to the importance and
dominance of the English common law in America as the basic founda-
tion for the study of law in our American universities in Colonial times.
(2) One hundred and fifty years later President Robert M. Hutchins
of the University of Chicago, who had previously served as Dean of
the Yale Law School, delivered an address before the Association of
American Law Schools in Chicago and reviewed the current trends in
legal education. His scholarly paper Autobiography of An Ex-Law
Student created a mild sensation among the law teachers assembled in
peaceful convention. It was the matured judgment of a legal educator
as to current legal reforms and their value. President Hutchins de-
picted the arrival of the new functional and experimental attitude in
the teaching of law-the Dewey system of education belatedly trans-
planted into the law schools.44 He described the advent of psychologists,
economists and other experts from adjoining disciples who promised
to be of material aid in the development of the new law and in the
eradication of the shortcomings of the common law. The net result
of the arrival of the men of science was socially pleasant but education-
ally worthless.45
Comparing the words of President Stiles in 1778 and the warning
words of President Hutchins in 1933 (150 years later) we have in brief
President Stiles prophesied that if the students pursued this course of law studies, a
native genius would arise, an American Bracton, Coke or Selden who would shape our
law and produce a learned commentary. In his audience was a young man not yet fifteen,
James Kent, who later fulfilled the prophecy in the publication of his great Commentaries.
44. The introduction of Professor John Dewey is not a mere incident in the treatment
of current legal education and its effect upon the present methods of adjudication. The
Dewey-Hutchins debate is a major event for it symbolizes a Great Divide in American
education and philosophy; and this gulf has now made its appearance in the law. For
present purposes we may say that the antagonistic positions of President Hutchins and
Professor Dewey in the matter of education in general parallel the presently formulating-
antagonisms in the field of legal education.
Elsewhere the writer has phrased this effect as follows: "Today in America a real
struggle is emerging between two polar and antithetical theories of law. For present pur-
poses we are going to entitle the issue between these contesting schools of juristic thought,
Scholasticism or Realism? The issue is between the old and the new jurisprudence; be-
tween scholasticism, aptly called the philosophia perennis, and realism, primarily American
in origin and personnel, which has but recently attained its jural majority. If these terms
are too elusive or flexible, the same crucial jurisprudential problem may be restated by
substituting other contrasting isms; Transcendentalism or functionalism? Conceptualism
or positivism? Rationalism or behaviorism?" KENNEDY, MY PHn~osoPrHY oF LAW (1941)
147.
45. "Empirical operations do not make a science. Facts do not organize themselves.
Let me emphasize as strongly as I can that we must acccmulate cases, facts, and data.
I simply insist that we must have a scheme into which to fit them." Hutchins, The
Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student (1934) 7 Amr. L. SCHOOL REv. 1051, 1055.
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summary the wide differences between the concept of law in Colonial
days and the sweeping changes in the common-law techniques which
were proposed in the early decades of the twentieth century. The most
startling change from President Stiles to President Hutchins is the loss
of faith in the common law, the skepticism regarding objective standards
and permanent principles, in fine, the erosion of the doctrine of stare
decisis.
We do not now stop to enumerate or to evaluate the antagonistic legal
philosophies all aimed at the common law structure in varied degrees.
This evaluation will be attempted later. These opposing legal theories,
many and diverse and yet overlapping and interlocked, are currently
taught in some law schools and publicized in the pages of law reviews
and journals. The importance of this absorption of current jurispru-
dential theories by our law students in competition with traditional law
is noteworthy. In the most extreme form, the progressive theories main-
tain that there is no permanent law, natural or constitutional, common
or uncommon; that law is realistically defined as a series of single judi-
cial experiences dependent upon the environment of the judges, their
hunches or heredity,4" the effect df the impact of behavior patterns,
4 7
even the influence of gastronomical impulses.
The arrival of the new jurisprudence was heralded in these words
by Justice Cardozo twelve years ago: "The most distinctive product
of the last decade in the field of jurisprudence is the rise of a group
of scholars styling themselves realists, and content with nothing less
than revision to its very roots of the method of judicial decision which
is part of the classical tradition."4
When it is recalled that Justice Cardozo, by virtue of his judicial
and extra-judicial writings, is entitled to speak with considerable author-
ity concerning jurisprudential reforms, the quoted appraisal gains in
strength and validity. Certain it is that he accurately and moderately
predicted the. course of legal realism in the suceeding years. The ex-
tremists in this movement have not only cut the methods of adjudication
to the "very roots" but are advocating the pulling up of the roots!49
First, let us consider the definition of constitutional law as it is
"realistically" defined by leading legal reformers. Max Lerner offers
a medicine-man interpretation in the following words: "Every tribe
46. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decisions (1929) 14 CoPa. L. Q. 274.
47. Moore and Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control (1943)
53 YALE L. J. 1.
48. Cardozo, Address before New York State Bar Association, 55 REPORT or NEW YORK
STATE BAR AssocArnoN (1939) 267.
49. Infra, notes 50-58.
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needs its totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours." Thurman
Arnold seconds the Lerner interpretation: "The language of the Con-
stitution is immateral since it represents current myths and folklore
rather than rules."'" It is needless to add that such definitions of Con-
stitutional principles do not leave much space for permanency of Consti-
tutional law; stare decisis is not only reduced in area, it is virtually
non-existent because all so-called Constitutional principles and rule
are dismissed as superstitious symbols and fantastic notions. Constitu-
tional law becomes merely the say-so of the Court without external
guide or norm to stay the whim or caprice of the Justices. Dean Pound
discussed critically this type of thinking regarding Constitutional law
in these words:
"Also in the United States the realists and on the Continent a type of
nationalist consider the idea of a state ruling according to law and not according
to will as superstitious or as decadent. They scoff at the idea of a people
solemnly covenanting by constitution or bill of rights to hew to announced
principles of right and justice and to reason, and striving by continued adher-
ence to judicial construction of their covenant to make it real in their political
behavior."'52
This political philosophy emphasizing will and power is perfectly
consonant with the eradication of precedent and the ouster of solidarity
of law. Indeed these theories feed upon the basic notion that law is
merely the individualized judgment of the Justice and nothing more
stable; that there is no external norm or standard in Constitutional law.
But this extreme viewpoint regarding the fluidity of law is not limited
to the definition or application of Constitutional law. The realists' attack
is also spreading through the whole body of the common law. A few
expressions of the realist pessimism and cynicism regarding common-
law traditions follow:
"The doctrine of precedent is a habit of mind in which stupidity may be
perpetuated on the ground that it is well established."' 3
"Why should we keep on sacrificing both justice and common sense on the
altar of legal principles? Why not get rid of the lawyers and their law."'54
"Let us banish from our professional tenets the absurd dogma 'a government
of laws and not of men' . . . there is no place for it in legal science."55
50. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1294.
51. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) 29.
52. POUND, THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1937) 19-20.
53. ROBinSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935) 31.
54. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS (1939) 254.
55. 'BINGHAM, My P osopiy OF LAW (1941) 16.
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"Jurisprudence . .. is a special branch of the science of transcendental
nonsense."5 6
judicial decision is reached after an emotive experience in which
principles and logic play a secondary part.' 's7
It should again be recalled that we are not attempting to approve or
to criticize the quotations above stated. Our present objective is merely
to establish the claim that American legal realism in its various forms
and titles is the most important single factor accounting for and applaud-
ing the general let-down in the doctrine of stare decisis.
But-it may be asked-why blur the Portrait of the New Supreme
Court with a double exposure which depicts the detours of legal scholars
from the main highways of Constitutional and common law? What
connection is there between these facts and current trends in the Supreme
Court? The first reason for this snap shot of the new jurisprudence is
that these departures from precedent and these pleas for individualiza-
tion of judicial decisions are strangely reminiscent of current open-court
comments by the Justices of the Supreme Court imploring their brethren
to exercise "self restraint"; warning them that it is "dangerous business"
to follow personal whim or caprice in the formulation of judicial deci-
sions; predicting that such excessive flexibility brings the law into dis-
repute; combating the distortion of the Supreme Court into a Super-
legislature and concluding with the give-it-up words of Justice Roberts
that adjudications in the Supreme Court were degenerating "into the
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good- for this day and train
only."'18 If there is one dominant note of complaint which runs through
the recent dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court it is the plea for
a return to stare decisis, a grim warning that law spells order ahd perma-
nency, that ours is a government of laws and not of men. The oddity
and also the comfort of this repetitious appeal for a return to precedents
is that all the Justices of the Court at some time or other have joined
in the expression that the doctrine is something more than a curio derived
from the common law.59 In the words of Justice Jackson, "We would
not much disagree about the theoretical significance of the doctrine of
56. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 CoL. L.
REV. 821.
57. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (1928) 37 YA.LE L. J.
468. See CHAsE, TscaRAx oF WoADs (1937) Ch. xvii; Waite, Judge Made Law and Edu-
cation of Lawyers (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 253.
58. Roberts, J., dis. op. in Smith v. Allwright, - U. S. -, 88 L' Ed. 701, 712 (1944).
59. Lewis, The History of Judicial Precedent (1930) 46 LAW Q. REv. 207; (1931) 47
id. 411; (1932) 48 id. 345.
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stare decisis however sharply we might divide about applying it to
specific cases." 0°
But whether the seeds of legal realism have been planted in the
Supreme Court or not, the Justices, and particularly the former law
professors now sitting on the Court,0 ' would probably agree with Chief
Judge Crane that law reviews and law schools have some effect upon
the course of law and the decisions of the Courts. Chief Judge Crane
once said:
"I may say-again speaking for myself, although I know of others who
follow similar practice-that in difficult cases dealing with intricate subjects
of law, about which there is much dispute and many conflicting decisions, I
eagerly turn to these college reviews, scan the index to see if any of these
college professors or teachers have written a paper upon the subject.. 62
'The importance of the contributions of law school and law review
has grown down the years. Hence, it certainly is not an over-exaggera-
tion to say that the continued emphasis upon change and flux in the
law must inevitably reach the chambers of the Supreme Court and have
some effect upon their decisions. 3 Whatever the sum total of present-
day effect may be, it is submitted that an examination of these current
philosophies is necessary as a potential and increasing factor in the
explanation of the breakdown of stare decisis.
The inevitable nature and effect of this new liberalism in judicial
decision are reflected in this plea for a judicial laissez faire where each
Justice is "on his own"; where pronouncements of the Court are "for
the day only" and even lower courts are urged to "beat the gun" by
overruling precedents before the Supreme Court has a chance to do so;
and where judicial precedents are evaluated in terms of the current
advertising slogan-"the fresher, the better"-all adding up to the
conclusion that there is warrant for the statement above made, that
60. See note 26 supra,
61. There are five justices of the Supreme Court who formerly taught law in American
Law Schools: Chief Justice Stone at Columbia University, Mr. Justice Roberts at Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, Mr. Justice Douglas at Yale University, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter at Harvard University, Mr. Justice Rutledge at Washington University.
62. Crane, Wly Law School Reviews? A Symposium (1935) 4 FORDHAmt L. REv. 1.
63. An example of the effect of professional opinion upon the decisions of the Supreme
Court is found in the brief history of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S.
586 (1940). This case was followed by a well-nigh unanimous ciiticism of the majority
opinion by the law reviews on the same. Kennedy, The Schneiderman Case-Some Legal
Aspects (1943) 12 FORHAa L. REV. 231n; The Bethlehem Steel Case-A Test of the
New Constitutionalism 1 (1942) 11 FORnIEAm L. REv. 133, 135-136n. Mr. Justice Jackson,
writing the majority opinion in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943)
directed attention to the strong criticism of the Minersville case by commentators and law
reviews. Id. at 635n.
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American legal realism may be charged with a substantial degree of
responsibility for the breakdown of stare decisis.
Is STARE DECISIS WORTH SAVING?
As a result of the examination of current case law in the Supreme
Court, it seems clear that the doctrine of stare decisis is suffering from
judical erosion in the Supreme Court and that its collapse is traceable
to many detached and separate causes of varying weights. This break-
down is partial or substantial depending upon the individual judge and
his degree of attachment to the common-law techniques or his avowal of
the new order which bears many labels of pragmatic or realist brands
of jurisprudence.
Before condemning or applauding this swing from precedents and the
infiltration of tailor-made law, to be fitted to individual case by the judge
according to his own pattern and without too much reliance on past
precedents, it may be in order to ask: Is Stare Decisis Worth Saving?
Certain it is that if an impartial review of this traditional method indi-
cates that the ancient doctrine is no longer able to defend itself, such
doctrine may require revision if not elimination. In answering the first
question, another naturally comes to mind: Was Stare Decisis worth
acquiring? Two queries are interlocked: The first analyzes the reasons
for the continuance of this doctrine in the future; the second appraises
the causes which produced stare decisis in the past. Unless the new
judicial methods promise and produce improvement, over the past tech-
niques, the current trial-and-error program with its emphasis upon free
judicial decisions may result in a trial of the patience of the clients, if
not of the lawyers and the courts, and the probability that error will
be the final result of the substitution of judicial independence for the
stability of the old order.
Let us therefore analyze the essentials of the doctrine of stare decisis,
then consider its good and bad features, ending with a comparison of
stare decisis and the modern substitutes now beginning to appear.
The doctrine of stare decisis presents in abbreviated form the classic
legal maxim: Stare decisis et non quieta movere.64 To adhere to prece-
dents, and not to unsettle things that are established. Thus stated, the
double objective apparent in this maxim is to hold fast to former case
law, and also to stabilize the law in action by refusing to overthrow
the existing precedents and to substitute novel and untried doctrines.
64. Rather oddly, the stated maxim despite its long years of service in the interest of
the common law, is treated collaterally in BRoom, LEGA MAXzhrs (loth ed. 1939) 90-93.
Herein it is considered as an appendage of another maxim, Omnis innovatio plus novitate
perturbat quam utilitate prodest. See infra p. 30.
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Amplified by courts and commentators, the doctrine of precedent may
be further explained and defended on several grounds which are not
wholly separate, but tend to overlap and coalesce. The arguments run
in these general channels:
(1) The law should be fixed because it is composed of a relatively
static and permanent body of rules and principles. Here we may detect
the lasting effect of the natural law, in its many forms"--a norm or
standard for evaluating human law. In this sense stare decisis posits some
superior rule and guide which controls and shapes the course of positive
law and presupposes that the human law must or may be tested by some
external principles. This fixity of law has an ancient origin and finds
substantial support in the earliest traditions of the common law in
England and in America." Latent also is the subsidiary aphorism that
ours is a government of law and not of men. Each litigant or suppliant
in our courts should be tried by one rule and one standard and not be
subjected to the whim or caprice of individualized justice determined
by the judge without the restriction of objective princples. One can also
discern in this idea of stare decisis the constitutional mandates guaran-
teeing equal protection of the laws and due process of law.
(2) The law should be definite because its precise definition is
necessary in the interests of public declaration and accurate prediction.
In stressing the definiteness of law we recognize the practical importance
of settled principles, known and knowable, so that all may be informed
of the legal consequences of a proposed plan'or program about to be
put into effect. Ignorance of the law may not excuse the layman, but
impossibility of predicting the law is certainly embarrassing to the
lawyer who seeks to advise his client and fatal to the client who is basing
his action upon such elusive advice. When it is considered that these
changes in judicial decisions are retroactive and not predictable by virtue
of the former state of the precedents, it seems unfair to visit the conse-
quences of such change upon an innocent individual who is law-abiding
but cannot be told where the law abides!
(3) The law should be stable because it generally represents the
growth, refinement and distillation of many years of experience, trial
and error. The theory of stare decisis is that the common law which
prevails at a given time did not just grow up, like Topsy, but is based
upon long years of gradual change and improvement. Perhaps the most
important reason for stare decisis is that the old established doctrine
65. Professor Hall has given us one of the best collection of authorities on the natural
law in recent years. HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938) 1-86. He also lists ten
meanings or interpretations of the term, natural law, in Book Review (1939) 52 HAuv.
L. REv. 1191. See generally, LEBUFFE & HAYES, JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1938).
66. Kennedy, Law Reviews "As Usual"? (1943) 12 FORDHAm L. REv. 50.
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should not be lightly dismissed without an opportunity to contest in
court the validity and efficacy of the old rules in comparison with the
new doctrines now proposed.67
These pertinent questions should be asked as preliminary queries
before ancient precedents are erased:
(1) Why should the old precedents be overruled?
(2) What are the proposed substitutes for the established rule?
(3) How are the new rules going to work?
These are not rhetorical questions; The Why, What and How ques-
tions are important. Stare decisis finds its most basic raison d'etre in
its insistence that ancient precedents generally have something more
than mere age to explain their continued existence despite the cynical
reference by Justice Holmes to the senseless adherence to laws of Henry
IV;6s that their replacement should be made only when the substituted
proposal proves its superiority in competition with the rule to be dis-
regarded; that this comparison should not be superficially made but
67. Realists attack one vulnerable point of the common law tradition in stating that
the inclination of the law is to move slowly and to resist change. This overemphasis upon
the status quo is typified by the dismayed New York lawyer who suddenly awoke to
the realization that the New York legislature had substituted the Civil Practice Act for
the Code of Civil Procedure thereby repealing at one stroke all the adjective law that
he knew. Despite the possibilities of conservatism in resisting changes, at the moment it
appears that the danger of harm is in the opposite direction, namely, the repeal of ancient
precedents and the adoption of new rules without considering the consequences of the
rapid change.
There is a "Green Pastures far away" complex sometimes visible in the rapid change
of old doctrines for new which is not without a touch of humor. For example, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court recently changed the established law in that state by providing
that federal estate taxes, instead of being prorated among all the distributees should be
deducted and paid out of the residuary estate, where there was no direction by the testator
as to the payment of the tax. Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College,
89 N. H. 471, 200 AtI. 786 (1938). In support of the change, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire refers to In re Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919) and other cases.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was seemingly unaware that New York in 1930
had abandoned the rule of In re Hamlin and adopted, by legislation, New Hampshire's
discarded doctrine of apportionment. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw (1930) § 124. The statutory
change in New York was only made after careful study of the relative values of the two
contrasted methods of payment of the federal estate tax. LzEis. Doe. (1930) No. 69 .pp.
197, 226. Pragmatism in Practice (1939) 8 FoRaHAm L. REv. 136.
68. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imi-
tation of the past." HOLmES, CoracmED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 187.
This oft-quoted passage has been used to justify change without emphasis upon the
consequences of the change, but it should be noted that justice Holmes carefully limited
his statement to situations wherein there was no reason but age to justify the continuance
of the rule of law.
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should take into consideration the probable results and consequences
of the new departure.
It may be safely concluded therefore that stare decisis is a doctrine
deeply imbedded in the common law and that it is based upon some-
thing more substantial than a formal rule or rule of form. It has been
long defended as a doctrine which combines the valuable qualities of
stability, certainty and predictability of law, and subordinates the possi-
bility of the individual viewpoint of a single judge or court however
inspired, determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants.
STARE DEciSS TODAY
Conceding then the inherent value of stare decisis as a sound working
rule, a concession which is clearly visible in many of the utterances of
the reorganized Supreme Court, however frequently the Court may
depart from the doctrine in practice, it is helpful to consider some of
the practical consequences of the doctrine and of the opposing theory
of free judicial decisions. Is stare decisis able to establish itself as some-
thing more than an antiquated curio and to justify itself at pedestrian
level of daily life? Has the doctrine any "salvage value" in our modern
age?
A convenient starting point in the evaluation of the advantages of
durable precedents is found in an ancient aphorism which has been long
since forgotten. The maxim runs like this: Omnis innovatio plus novi-
tate perturbat quam utilitate prodest.6' Every innovation occasions
more harm by its novelty than benefit by its utility. This moth-eaten
aphorism will doubtless startle our modern reformers and with good
reason. We need not pause very long in noting the extreme and abso-
lutist manner in which the ancient maxim is framed, nor need we with-
hold an immediate admission that its liberal application would virtually
outlaw all change and modification of current precedents. But we revert
to this maxim for the limited purpose of pointing out that there are
evidences that the Supreme Court and other courts have forgotten that
within the discarded shell of this abandoned maxim there is still a rem-
nant of truth to be kept in mind. A modern and modified counterpart
of this ancient rule has appeared in critical opinions by the dissenting
Justices of the Supreme Court. The most recent warning was phrased
by Chief Justice Stone in the South-Estern case: "And before over-
ruling a precedent in any case it is the duty of the Court to make certain
that more harm will not be done in rejecting than in retaining a rule
of even dubious validity."7 Here the Chief Justice strikes the core of
69. BROOM, LEGAL MAxnrs (10th ed. 1939) 90.
70. 322 U. S. 579 (1944). The text quotation from the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion
refers with approval to the sentiment expressed in Mr. Justice Brandeis' well-known
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the problem of stare decisis as it is developing in the Supreme Court
today. He serves notice that one of the gravest dangers in the multiple
fluctuations and changes running through the Supreme Court opinions
is the growing fear that more harm than good will follow the many
changes of the settled precedents without adequate consideration of the
consequences which will follow the establishment of the new rules.7'
A frequent criticism of the doctrine of stare decisis is the complaint
that it freezes the common law, prohibits all change or improvement
and develops into a straitjacket which defies the translation of all social
and economic reforms into the law. This excessive rigidity is not, and
never was, a necessary part of stare decisis, although it is true that
zealous justices have sometimes erected an insurmountable barrier and
opposition against any and all legislative changes by the federal or state
legislatures on the ground that the legislative program offended funda-
mentals of natural or common law. Apart from this unwarranted use of
the "natural law" theory or the "due process" or "equal protection of the
law" clauses of the Constitution to check beneficial and helpful social an'd
economic legislation, the doctrine of stare decisis is broad enough to
permit progressive legislation. The principles of stability and change
are likewise joined in the true common-law formula. Another old maxim
of the common law is: Cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex.7" Reason
is the soul of the law and when reason ceases, so does the common law
itself. This right of the Court within the framework of the common
law to revalue a line of precedent and to reconsider the reasons that
shaped the original rule and to modify or change it-reason demanding
and experience justifying the change-has long been recognized. This
necessity of change is not the discovery of any new school of jurispru-
dence 7 3 although it is true that legal realism has contributed much to
dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-409, n. 1-4
in which he says: "Stare decisis is usually the precise policy, because in most matters it
it more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."
The same warning appears in BROOM, op. cit. supra note 69, at 92-93: "With respect
to matters which do not affect existing rights to any great degree, but tend principally to
influence future transactions, it is for similar reasons generally considered more important
that the rule of law should be settled, than that it should be theoretically correct."
71. justice Jackson also emphasized the value of caution in ripping up old landmarks
when he issued the following caveat against the easy overthrow of settled precedents:
"The orderly way to nationalize insurance supervision, if it be desirable, is not by court
decision but through legislation. Judicial decision operates on the states and the industry
retroactively. We cannot anticipate, and more than likely we could not agree, what con-
sequences upon tax liabilities, refunds, liabilities under state law to states or to individuals,
and even criminal liabilities will follow this decision." United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Assoc., 322 U. S. 533, 593 (1944), cited supra note 4.
72. BROOM, LEG0AL MAxmi (loth ed. 1939) 97.
73. Scholastic philosophy of law is generally regarded as the most adamant adherent
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the warning that legal inertia was frequently present in the habit of
judicial acceptance of old cases without any attempt to revalue or re-
examine their foundations.
This maxim which emphasizes reason as the core of law found ex-
pression in the early English case-law and runs through later American
state decisions.74 Such measure of flexibility is defended by liberal
judges, but also by conservative judges in our own day." It is certainly
not the possession of any one legal cult however progressive or modern
it may be. Today this same maxim provides an adequate opportunity
to test out an ancient rule carefully and fully and to propose a new
one after a studied consideration of the consequences of the proposed
change.
Another classic maxim in the common-law which recognizes a flexible
factor in the evaluation of law is the following: Ex facta jus oritur"
Law is based upon facts. With a change in the material facts there
may come a change in the law. Mr. Justice Brandeis accepted the
present-day utility of this opinion in Adams v. Tanner: "The judgment
should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possi-
ble-Ex facta jus oritur. The ancient rule must prevail in order that
we may have a system of living law."77
Thus it appears that the doctrine of stare decisis combines reason
and experience, logic and fact. It does not require or demand continued
and servile adherence to any and all precedents. It permits growth,
ordered and planned. But the doctrine of stare decisis refuses to con-
cede that change necessarily connotes progress. It respects the ages, if
not age; it recognizes that judicial intelligence may have been present
in the formation and painful growth of the original rule and that judicial
inertia is not always the cause for its retention.
DANGERS AHEAD
It seems very likely that the trend away from stare decisis, the turn
about from precedents, the tendency to build up and expand "that
to natural law and fixed legal rules and principles. Yet St. Thomas, the leading exponent
of scholasticism, says regarding the change in laws: "On the part of man, whose actions
are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on qccount of the changed conditions
of man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition.
...human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common
weal." Tn: SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Translated by the Fathers of
the English Dominican Province) Part II, First Part, Third No., QQXCVII, pp. 77, 79.
74. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
75. Sutherland, J., in Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 384 (1933). See Obiter Dicta,
infra pp. 123-124.
76. BROOM, LEGAL, MAXMS (10th ed. 1939) 57.
77. Brandeis, J., dis. op., 244 U. S. 590, 600 (1917).
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wilderness of single instances" which aroused the poetic fire of Tenny-
son7s are now under way and are not going to be easy to st6p. But
we may venture a glance into the future in the belief that present signs
may portray the dangers ahead if the excesses of juristic individualism
are not checked.
Anticipatory Reversals. One of the most ominous developments of
the present era marked by the departure from the pathway of prece-
dent, is the late arrival of a new phase of free judicial thinking. Fol-
lowing closely the striking" increase in the number of overthrown prece-
dents and decisions in the Supreme Court,79 we are now faced with a
new phenomenon which may be called "Anticipatory Reversals," a bud-
ding process of adjudication which allows and even invites the Circuit
Court bf Appeals to anticipate departures from precedent by the Supreme
Court and to take the initiative by forecasting the reversal of the
Supreme Court decisions by the inferior appellate court. This new
development which permits the lower courts to "beat the gun" and to
reverse decisions of the Supreme Court by a sort of juristic preview
apparently originated in an unsigned Comment in the Yale Law Journal
entitled The Attitude of Lower Court to Changing Precedents."° This
proposal seems to have been incorporated into the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit by Judge Jerome Frank in
Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp.,"1 when hesaid:
"We would stultify ourselves and unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court
if-adhering to the dogma, obviously fictional to any reader of its history,
that alterations in that court's principles of decision never occur unless recorded
in explicit statements that earlier decisions are overruled-we stubbornly and
literally followed decisions which have been, but not too ostentatiously, modi-
fied. 'The life of the law,' as Mr. Justice Holmes said, 'has been experience.'
Legal doctrines, as first enunciated, often prove to be inadequate under the
impact of ensuing experience in their practical application. And when a lower
court perceives a pronounced new doctrinal trend in Supreme Court decisions,
it is its duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow not to resist it."'8 2
tater cases in the Circuit Court of Appeals give evidence that this
new policy of anticipatory reversals is catching hold. 3
78. "Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,
Thro' which a few, by wit or fortune led,
May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame."
Tennyson, Aylmer's Field (1927), Macmillan Ed. 139, 146.
79. See notes 2-4 supra.
80. (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1448.
81. 128 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
82. Id. at 217-218.
83. Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 139 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
19451
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Certain observations may be made regarding the possibilities of this
new development in free judicial thinking. If the Circuit. Court of Ap-
peals is privileged to reverse the Supreme Court by anticipation, why
not extend the same privilege to all inferior courts? The proponents
of this reversal formula would doubtless nod assent. This process brings
back memories of Judge Hutcheson's hunch theory with something new
added. In fact, it will now be necessary for the lawyer to prepare his
brief with an eye to inspiring the trial judge to indulge in a hunch as to
the possibility of the Circuit Court's risking a hunch regarding the ulti-
mate hunch of the Supreme Court, "when, as and if" the given problem
reaches the highest court in our land. Otherwise stated, the anticipatory-
reversal program gives promise of the evolution of a new hunch-with
a triple aspect!
Judicial Legislation. Time was and not so long ago when the old
Supreme Court was condemned, not infrequently with reason, because
it was holding back social and economic legislation through the unwar-
ranted distortion of general phrases of the constitution."4 The charge
was attractively phrased by contending that the Supreme Court since
tlhe turn of the Twentieth Century had increasingly arrogated to itself
the functions of a Super-legislature, evaluating the wisdom, expediency
and even necessity of legislative reforms passed by the Congress and
the State legislatures.
But alas it seems that the new Court under the guise of "interpreta-
tion" is increasingly guilty of similar usurpation of the functions of
the legislature and creating a new Super-legislature. This process of
judicial legislation has had a slow, but steady growth. We may begin
with the classic statement of Lord Bacon that the function of the justice
is only "jus dicere et non jus dare," to interpret law not to make law.85
Then follows Justice Holmes' famous statement that "Judges do and
must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially, they are confined
from molar to molecular motions.""6 Now we are informed that "it
would be hardihood to deny that judges can, and do, legislate massively
as well as molecularly."87
Limiting our comment to judicial legislation which seeks to enlarge
statutes through the process of "interpretation" or "explanation" or
84. The typical example of this enlargement of constitutional law centers around the
XIV Amendment with its illusive terms, "due process of law," "liberty," and "equal pro-
tection of the laws." It was such expansion which Mr. Justice Holmes attacked so severely
in his dissenting opinions. For example, see Holmes, J.,' dis. op. in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45, 74 (1905).
85. BROom, LEorAL MA.XIs (10th ed. 1939) 91.
86. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917).
87. Waite, Judge-Made Law and the Education of Lawyers (1944) 38 A. B. A. J. 253.
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through the device of assuming a legislative "policy" which permits of
the judicial gloss, it appears that a growing dissent against this practice
is visible among the Justices of the Supreme Court. It seems that there
is a danger that the justices who indulge in the methods of judicial
legislation will readily "see" policies in the statute which are not there
and "read in" policies which are deemed to be advisable in reenforcement
of the statutory enactment.
A typical phrasing of the evils of the judicial legislation is found in
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Anderson v. Abbott."8 There the ques-
tion was precisely one of statutory construction. Said Mr. Justice
Jackson:
"We have been unable to find that Congress ever has announced a legislative
policy such as the Court announces. And the Court nowhere points it out....
The Court is not enforcing a policy of Congress; it is competing with Congress
in creating new regulations in banking, a field peculiarly within legislative
rather than judicial competence."""
The gathering signs indicate that the time will come, if it is not already
here, when the same criticism directed against the old Supreme Court
for its invasion of the functions of the legislature will be directed to
the new Supreme Court on the ground that it has gradually created a
new Super-legislature, not for the purpose of overthrowing social and
economic reforms as did the old Court, but for the purpose of amplifying
and expanding legislative enactments according to its own superior
wisdom.
Ultra Legal Realism. More remote, but still possible within the
pronouncements of the advanced group of realists, is the overthrow of
constitutional and common law,90 and the substitution of emotional juris-
prudence reminiscent of Lord Hermand's jurisprudence of "feeling."9
One commentator has phrased this new way of diagnosing judicial per-
sonalities in these words: "It is now possible in all social circles, the
most conservative as well as the most radical, to lift the skirts of the
Court and see the boots of the Justices."9 This metaphor is not without
a semblance of literal truth, for it expresses the present tendency to
intermix the judge's powers of digestion, decision and perambulation.
Podiatric jurisprudence has arrived.
Lest it be thought that this warning of the possible termination of the
seven-century reign of the common law and the century and a half
of constitutional law is without foundation, it might be well to recall
88. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349 (1944).
89. Id. at 375, 380.
90. See supra, notes 50-57.
91. See supra, p. 13.
92. McLeish, Foreword, FRANFURTE R, LAW AND POLITICS (1939) xii.
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that this very collapse of law has been a parallel phenomenon arriving
in every instance with totalitarian and dictatorial governments. 3
But a distinguishing mark of Western Civilization has been the guar-
anty of Rule by Law94-- the promise and performance of regularized
rules, reasonably predictable and predetermined, known or knowable
by all and applied for the benefit of all-and equally. Correspondingly
the common law tradition rejects the right of the individual-king, judge
or commissioner-to act or decide arbitrarily. A benevolent despot is
not saved by alluring adjectives. More precious than any plan or pro-
gram of political policy or legal philosophy is Rule by Law, symbolized
by the deeply imbedded doctrine of stare decisis. Let us not fritter it
away for the genius of any judge, however brilliant, or any court,
however benign.
93. "As things are today, I cannot but think that much of the attack on stare decisis
is a part of the revival of absolutism which is so prominent in political and juristic thought
throughout the world." Pound, What of Stare Decisis? (1941) 10 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1.
Timasheff, The Legal Regimentation of Cltlture in National Socialist Germany (1942) 11
FoRDHAm L. REv. 1.
94. "Nothing distinguishes more clearly a free country from a country under arbitrary
government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the Rule
of Law. Stripped of technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound
by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules that make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and
to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." HAYXE, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944), condensed in the READER'S DIGEST, April 1945, p. 13.
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